











1.  Epistemic Goals

Bayesians typically take probabilities as rational degrees of belief.  Some Bayesians define degrees of belief to ensure conformity with standard axioms of probability.  According to a common definition, degrees of belief are the values of a function P obeying the axioms of probability such that, if gambles have the same stakes, an agent prefers a gamble that p to a gamble that q if only if P(p) > P(q).  Other Bayesians take degrees of belief to express propositional attitudes not defined in terms of preferences.  According to their account, degrees of belief do not obey the axioms of probability by definition.  These Bayesians undertake to show that rational degrees of belief nonetheless meet those axioms.  They use principles of rationality to show that rational degrees of belief conform to the axioms.
The Dutch book argument offers a common way of establishing that rational degrees of belief conform to the probability axioms.  The argument shows that if a person uses degrees of belief to post odds at which she will buy or sell bets, then she is not open to a Dutch book (a system of bets that guarantees a loss) if and only if her degrees of belief conform to the probability axioms.  The literature presents many objections to using the Dutch book argument to explain why rational degrees of belief obey the probability axioms.  One weighty objection concedes that the argument establishes its conclusion but claims that the argument nonetheless does not explain why rational degrees of belief obey the probability axioms.  The argument offers only pragmatic reasons for complying with the axioms.  However, because the axioms of probability are epistemic constraints on degrees of belief, showing why rational degrees of belief conform requires epistemic reasons for conformity.  The axioms do not have the epistemic grounding they require unless even an agent without pragmatic interests has reasons to comply with the axioms.
This objection turns on the distinction between justification and explanation.  It holds that the Dutch book argument shows that rational degrees of belief conform to the probability axioms but nonetheless does not explain why they conform.  The distinction between justification and explanation is especially salient when one seeks a particular type of explanation that available justifications do not provide.  For example, one may use logic to justify the disjunction that Jones is in his office or Jones is not in his office.  Still, one may lack an explanation of the disjunction that identifies the disjunct that makes the disjunction true.  Also, after looking into Jones's office, one may conclude that Jones is not in it.  Still, one may not know why Jones is not in his office.  Has he left to teach a class, or to get some coffee?  One's looking into his office provides justification that he is absent but not an explanation of his absence.  The Dutch book argument justifies rational degrees of belief's compliance with the probability axioms without providing an epistemic explanation of that compliance.
A promising epistemic argument for having degrees of belief that comply with the probability axioms identifies an epistemic goal of degrees of belief and then shows that degrees of belief meet that goal only if they conform with the axioms.  One way of filling out the argument holds that matching objective probabilities is an epistemic goal of degrees of belief.  Matching objective probabilities is an epistemic goal at a time, the argument claims, because in an indeterministic world some truths are inaccessible at that time.  Only objective probabilities are physically accessible, so matching them is the appropriate goal.  For example, if a person's degree of belief that a coin toss yields heads is 50%, then, because the objective probability of heads is 50%, the person's degree of belief meets its epistemic goal.  Because objective probabilities obey the probability axioms, a person's degrees of belief also conform to those axioms if each of his degrees of belief attain its epistemic goal and matches the corresponding objective probability.  Such an argument is called a calibration argument because it holds that the epistemic objective of degrees of belief is calibration with objective probabilities, that is, matching objective probabilities.
The calibration argument just sketched fails because in some cases a rational degree of belief does not have the epistemic goal of matching the corresponding objective probability.  Suppose that a person knows that a trick coin has either two heads or two tails, and the two possibilities are equally likely.  50% is his degree of belief that a toss of the coin yields heads.  This degree of belief is rational but does not match the coin's objective probability of heads, and the person knows this.  It therefore is not plausible that degrees of belief have the goal of matching objective probabilities.
To handle this problem, the calibration argument may revise the epistemic goal of a degree of belief.  It may claim that the epistemic goal is to match an estimate of the corresponding objective probability.  In the case of the trick coin, 50% is a reasonable estimate of the coin toss's objective probability of yielding heads.  Shimony (1988) advances a calibration argument for the probability axioms that rests on the epistemic goal of estimating objective probabilities.
This revision of a degree of belief's epistemic goal nonetheless confronts a problem.  Suppose that a coin toss's objective probability of yielding heads is 50%, but a completely reliable crystal ball tells a person that the coin toss will yield heads.  In this case 100% is the person's rational degree of belief that the toss will produce heads.  The maximum degree of belief is rational although it does not match a reasonable estimate of the coin toss's objective probability of yielding heads.
An event's objective probability may vary with time.  A coin toss's objective probability of yielding heads may be 1/2 when the coin is tossed and then 1 when the coin lands with heads up.  In the case of the toss that the crystal ball predicts, 100% is not a reasonable estimate of the current objective probability of heads.  It is rather a reasonable estimate of heads’ objective probability at the time of the coin's landing.  The crystal ball furnishes access to a future objective probability.  Does a degree of belief have the epistemic goal of estimating, to the extent possible, the temporally most advanced corresponding objective probability?  Advancing such an epistemic goal is an ad hoc response to the case of the crystal ball.
A calibration argument appealing to estimates must explain the type of estimation that is a degree of belief's epistemic goal.  In the case of the trick coin, one needs an explanation why 50% and not 100% is an appropriate estimate.  50% guarantees that the error is no greater than 50%.  However, 100% offers a 50% chance that the error is 0%.  Why not use an estimate that takes chances to reduce error?  Although 50% is a reasonable estimate, the calibration argument needs an account of its reasonableness.  The case of the crystal ball makes vivid the need for a general account of reasonable estimates.  The goal of estimating a future objective probability is unsubstantiated without such a general account.
A general account of estimation must solve a hard problem.  Showing that rational degrees of belief match some quantities obeying the axioms of probability is not enough to explain epistemically why rational degrees of belief obey those axioms.  Suppose that rational degrees of belief match estimates of objective probabilities, and the estimates obey the axioms.  These results may only justify that rational degrees of belief conform to the probability axioms without also epistemically explaining their conformity to those axioms.  An explanation identifies the reason for their conformity and not a just a sign of their conformity.  The failings of the Dutch book argument recur for the calibration argument unless the estimates it invokes are explanatory.

2.  Strength of Evidence

So that the calibration argument explains degrees of belief's compliance with the probability axioms, one may replace objective probabilities and their estimates with an epistemic goal more directly connected with the epistemic function of degrees of belief.  A degree of belief assesses a proposition's belief worthiness.  A proposition is belief worthy to the extent that evidence supports it.  Hence an epistemic goal of degrees of belief is to match strength of evidence.  The epistemic reason that rational degrees of belief obey the probability axioms is that they match strength of evidence, and strength of evidence obeys those axioms.  In the case of the trick coin, 50% is the right degree of belief because it fits the evidence.  Similarly, in the case of the crystal ball, 100% is the right degree of belief because it matches strength of evidence.  The rest of the paper elaborates and defends this version of the calibration argument.  This section elaborates the argument, and the next section defends it.
The calibration argument should recognize that a degree of belief is a passive state and not in an agent's direct control.  Hence, a rational agent does not adjust a degree of belief to match strength of evidence.  Instead the agent responds to strength of evidence so that the degree of belief matches it.  Matching strength of evidence is not an epistemic goal of an agent.  Instead, it is a standard of epistemic success for the agent.  A degree of belief's epistemic function is to respond to strength of evidence.  When I speak of a degree of belief's epistemic goal, I do not mean a goal that the agent has, but rather a goal that the degree of belief has in virtue of its epistemic function.
A degree of belief that fulfills its epistemic function also fulfills its pragmatic function.  It directs action best if it responds only to strength of evidence.  Suppose that an agent adjusts it to respond to her goals.  That risks making degrees of belief unsuited for directing action.  Adjusting a degree of belief to attain goals may make it respond to a goal besides representing strength of evidence.  Even if the goal is epistemic, that risks making degrees of belief misdirect action.
An epistemic goal is having degrees of belief equal 1 for truths and equal 0 for falsehoods.  This goal is not at odds with the goal of having degrees of belief that match strength of evidence.  The two goals govern aspirations in different circumstances.  The first goal is attainable given full information.  The second goal expresses a method of pursuing the first goal given incomplete information.  The first goal is degree of belief's primary goal, and the second goal is a subsidiary goal for pursuit of the primary goal given incomplete information.  If an agent does not know whether a proposition is true or false, instead of gambling with an assignment of 1 or 0, a degree of belief does better epistemically with an intermediate value matching the strength of evidence for the proposition.
Belief's primary external epistemic goal is truth.  Belief's secondary internal epistemic goal for pursuit of the primary goal given incomplete information is justification.  Truth and justification are for belief what matching truth and matching strength of evidence are for degree of belief.  A degree of belief that matches strength of evidence is justified even if it is less than 1 for a true proposition.  (Of course, an agent may not be justified in having that degree of belief if he forms it haphazardly and only by luck matches strength of evidence).
Matching strength of evidence is a goal for a single degree of belief.  An agent may only approximate that goal.  An assignment of degrees of belief to a set of propositions has the goal of perfect calibration, that is, for each degree of belief matching strength of evidence.  The assignment may approximate the goal by having each degree of belief approximate strength of evidence, by having many degrees of belief exactly match strength of evidence although a few degrees of belief fall far from the mark, or by some combination of these types of approximation.  Scoring an assignment's overall success in meeting the goal of calibration is a challenging project I put aside.
Ideal agents know all a priori truths, including truths about strength of evidence.  An ideal agent knows the strength of her evidence for a proposition.  Rationality requires that her degree of belief match strength of evidence.  A version of the Principal Principle requires that a degree of belief match strength of evidence if it is known.  Hence, that principle requires ideal agents to have degrees of belief that match strength of evidence.
The epistemic goal for degrees of belief is internal rather than external.  An ideal agent knows whether her degrees of belief match strength of evidence.  If rational, she knows that her degrees of belief, matching strength of evidence, will properly fulfill their pragmatic function of directing action given incomplete information about acts' consequences for attainment of her goals.
For people and other cognitively limited agents, calibration is a not a requirement but only a goal of rationality.  People have good excuses for falling short, such as failure to appreciate strength of evidence because of nonculpable ignorance of principles of inductive reasoning.  A person may not realize the strength of his evidence for a proposition.  Rationality may then excuse his failure to have a degree of belief that matches his strength of evidence.  He should aspire to attain the goal although his ignorance of inductive logic excuses lapses.
The calibration argument concludes that rational degrees of belief obey the probability axioms.  It draws this conclusion about an ideal agent's rational degrees of belief.  Real people may have rational degrees of belief that violate those axioms.  Their degrees of belief may be rational despite falling short of the epistemic goal for them.

3.  Objections and Replies

Strength of evidence is degree of confirmation, inductive probability, or epistemic probability.  Carnap ([1950] 1962) tries to define it in terms of structural features of sentences expressed in a formal language.  Problems that Goodman (1950) and others uncover show the implausibility of a Carnapian definition of strength of evidence.  One objection to the previous section’s calibration argument is that strength of evidence does not exist.
Goodman discredits a definition of strength of evidence but not strength of evidence itself.  Even if strength of evidence lacks a Carnapian definition, it may be measured.  Games of chance provide propositions about which the strength of evidence is clear.  The strength of evidence that a fair coin lands with heads up when tossed is 1/2.  The strength of evidence that a six turns up on a roll of a fair die is 1/6.  Using such benchmarks, and relying on comparative judgments shared by experts, one can measure the strength of evidence for a proposition as finely as one likes.  For some propositions the strength of evidence may be indefinite.  Then matching strength of evidence leads to an indefinite degree of belief.  This is as it should be.  James Hawthorne (forthcoming) presents a representation theorem that derives the measurement of probabilities from comparisons of probability.  His theorem allows for some probabilities' being indefinite.  Interpreting probability as strength of evidence, his representation theorem establishes the measurability of strength of evidence using comparisons of evidence's force.
Subjective Bayesianism provides a second objection.  It insists that two rational people with the same evidence may have different degrees of belief for the same proposition.  Adopting a calibration argument with matching strength of evidence as the epistemic goal of degrees of belief amounts to advancing objective Bayesianism.  Objective Bayesianism allows that evidence often does not settle a precise degree of belief.  Does rationality permit different ways of settling a precise degree of belief, or does it require not assigning any precise degree of belief?  Objective Bayesianism and the calibration argument require suspension of judgment.
Rather than argue against subjective Bayesianism, this section aims for reconciliation about pragmatic, not epistemic, matters.  Both objective and subjective Bayesianism may settle on the same standard for decisions, namely, the requirement not to adopt an option that according to every probability and utility assignment compatible with one's total evidence has less expected utility than another option.  When probability and utility assignments are imprecise, this standard of expected utility maximization permits any decision that maximizes expected utility given some quantization of beliefs and desires.  Given agreement on decision principles, the disagreement between objective and subjective Bayesian is contained.  Bayesian decision theory may live with their disagreement about suspension of judgment.
A third objection is that the calibration argument using strength of evidence just pushes back the need to provide reasons for conforming to the probability axioms.  It shows that rational degrees of belief comply given that strength of evidence complies, but needs supplementation with an argument that strength of evidence complies with the probability axioms.
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